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V 
A. NATURE OF CASE. 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Case represents yet another chapter in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce epic which shows 
no signs of nearing completion. See Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 336 P.3d 275 (2014), 
reh'g denied (Nov. 6, 2014). As was stated in Mr. Saliaz' petit10n for rehearing in Baird-Sallaz 
v. Sallaz "This appeal represents only one of several cases arising out of the central core of facts 
to be brought before this Court." See Page 5 of October 22, 2014 Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant-Appellant's Petition for Rehearing filed in Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz.). See also Id at p. 7 
( discussing impending collateral attacks en the property distribution of the Baird-Sallaz marital 
estate). Now, almost a year and a half after the trial held herein, Appellants have provided a 45-
page rambling brief asserting arguments in support of claims they never raised below. However, 
despite the latter day assertion new claims on appeal, the holding of Smith v. Idaho State Univ. 
Fed. Credit Union, l 14 Idaho 680, 683, 760 P.2d 19, 22 (1988) requires this Court to affirm the 
decision of the Trial Court. 
By Respondents' counsel's count, since 2004 some aspect of Mr. Sallaz's divorce has 
been before approximately 12 district court judges, 2 bankruptcy judges, several magistrates, 3 
Supreme Court appeals, and several administrative agencies. Some of the related cases include: 
Sallaz v. Baird-Sallaz, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1217666 (an "Independent Action to 
Overturn Judgment"); Rice v. Sallaz, 159 Idaho 148, 357 P.3d 1256 (2015) (dealing with the 
Dennis Sallaz' mid-divorce trial sale of his ex-wife's house, now on remand to Canyon County); 
Sallaz v. Rice, Ada County Case No. CV OC-2011-19362 (an administrative appeal from an 
adverse ITO administrative decision regarding the same 1954 Cadillac at issue in this case); State 
of Idaho v. Dennis Sallaz, Canyon County Case No. CR 10-29076-c (grand theft of Ms. Baird's 
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trailer dismissed along with several other unrelated cases due to unrelated prosecutorial 
misconduct of an investigator working with the attorney general's office & an apparent political 
cover-up); In Re Real Homes, LLC, Chapter 11 Case No. 05-02051 (Bkr. D. Idaho 2005); In Re 
Renee Baird l 2-00904-JDP (Bkr. D. Idaho 2012); and Dennis Sallaz, Plaintiff v. Renee Baird, 
Debtor, Chapter 7 Adversary Case 12-006038-JDP (Bkr. D. Idaho 2012) (challenging the 
discharge of Ms. Baird's debt in bankruptcy). Various other Sallaz v. Sallaz collateral offshoot 
cases exist which are not germane to the issues or parties presently before the Court. This drama 
playing out before you represents a colossal waste of resources and, in light of the fact that Mr. 
Sallaz is a well-known attorney, ultimately reflects poorly on our justice system and our state 
Bar. The fact that Mr. Sallaz is represented by another attorney known for his collateral attacks 
on his own divorce judgment provides a glimpse of the symbiotic relationships which will 
flourish among unscrupulous members of the legal community if those with the power to 
reprimand criminally dishonest attorneys neglect to do so. See Smith v. Smith, 136 Idaho 120, 29 
P.3d 956 (Ct. App. 2001); Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431,860 P.2d 634 (1993); Smith v. Smith, 
131 Idaho 800, 964 P.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998). 
This particular Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce offshoot case arises out of the following events. 
In connection with his divorce, Mr. Sallaz testified that his longtime friend, client, and business 
partner Roy Rice had a lien on Mr. Sallaz' prized 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. See Defendant's Trial 
Exhibit 213A, at 7; TR pp. 423 - 427, 433-435; 437-440, 442. 1 The two longtime friends then 
had a falling out due to Mr. Rice's discovery that Mr. Sallaz had fraudulently sold him Renee 
1 It is often difficult to directly quote Mr. Sallaz in a block quotation to include directly in the brief due to Mr. 
Sallaz' propensity to avoid answering relatively simple questions. Additionally, his legal counsel's 
testimonial/speaking objections often interrnpt and confuse what should otherwise be a simple question and 
response. Sec R-00033 Record of Actions (Order Granting Defcndant/Counterclaimant's Motion in Lirninc re: 
Speaking Objections and Testimonial Questions.) Thus, the citations to the transcript are provided to direct the 
Court to the page range over which Mr. Sallaz testifies. 
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Baird's house during the midst of the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce trial. See Rice v. Sallaz, 159 Idaho 
P.3d 1256 (2015).2 In early 2011, Mr. Rice set out to exercise self-help and 
repossessed the 1954 Cadillac in reliance on the lien interest granted to him by Dennis Sallaz. 
Following a 2011 repossession by Mr. Rice, Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz filed suit for Claim and 
Delivery of a 1954 Cadillac on April 11, 2011. The named Defendants were Eugene (Roy) Rice 
and Janet Rice, husband and wife, and Michael Rice. 
The Complaint also contained a claim for Conversion, plead in the alternative which 
contained what would be the first of a rapidly escalating, yet factually unsubstantiated, increase 
in valuation by Mr. Sallaz: 
If Defendants cannot redeliver the 1954 Cadillac to the Plaintiff, he has been 
damaged in the amount of $75,000, together with all damages or injuries to the 
vehicle. 
Verified Complaint R-00047. 
Mr. Sallaz ultimately attempted to claim that the vehicle was worth over $100,000 at trial 
(TR pp. 420, 1810) despite testifying in 2005 in connection with his divorce that it was worth no 
more than $25,000 (TR. pp. 425-426, 434), despite telling the initial investigating officer on 
February 8, 2011 it was worth $30,000 (see Defendant's Trial Exhibit 138 at 2) and despite 
claiming he transferred ownership of the vehicle to his fiancee, Marcy Fox (for no monetary 
consideration) in early 2011. TR. pp. 394-395; 420. 
The gift transfer to Ms. Fox resulted in her joinder as involuntary plaintiff despite Mr. 
Sallaz' contention that he was asserting the case in Ms. Fox's place under a power of attorney. 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit B, TR p. 313. Ultimately, through a series of legal missteps combined 
with an adverse jury verdict, Mr. Sallaz failed to recover anything whatsoever from the Rices. 
2 The sale was to have taken place through an asset purchase and sale agreement for Real Properties, LLC to acquire 
Real Homes, LLC. We now know Mr. Sallaz created Real Properties, LLC for his clients, the Rices, as a vehicle by 
which Mr. Sallaz could attempt to secrete or cloud title to assets during his divorce from Ms. Baird. 
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Never having adequately plead a claim for relief below, Dennis Sallaz now asserts that because 
statute of limitations had run on the underlying debt, he should be entitled to essentially re-
write his complaint and do an end run around jury instructions he never asked the District Court 
to submit. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On April 11, 2011 Plaintiff Dennis J. Sallaz filed a two count Verified Complaint related 
to the subject 1954 Cadillac. R-45-50. Count I sought Claim and Delivery pursuant to LC. § 8-
301. 
In an action of claim and delivery, LC. § 8-301, the right to immediate and 
exclusive possession of the property must exist at the time the action is 
commenced. 
Nat'! Motor Serv. Co. v. Walters, 85 Idaho 349, 358, 379 P.2d 643, 649 (1963) 
(Emphasis added). 
In support of this element of his case as to both counts, Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz stated: 
At all times relevant hereto ( except as may be specified), Plaintiff was the sole 
owner of a 1945 Cadillac, VIN 546265334. 
Verified Complaint R- 00045. 
Attached to the Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A" was a duplicate title, with an unrecorded lien 
release purportedly executed by Roy Rice in 1995, as well as an unrecorded assignment of Mr. 
Sallaz' interest to his fiancee, Marcy Fox dated January 1, 2011. 3 R-00049, TR pp. 311-313, 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit A, and Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 700. What appears to have happened is 
Mr. Sallaz obtained a duplicate title five days after the date Mr. Rice's lien interest arose. Sec 
Defendant's Trial Exhibit 228 at 13-15 and TR pp. 402- 403. Mr. Rice maintained that the 
3 
"In all cases of transfer of vehicles the application for certificates of title shall be filed within thirty (30) calendar 
days after the delivery of the vehicles. Licensed dealers need not apply for certificate of title for vehicles in stock or 
when they are acquired for stock purposes." I.C. 49-504(5) 
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signature on the unrecorded lien release on Mr. Sallaz' duplicate title was a forgery. R 0044 & R 
0053, TR 399. The duplicate title Mr. Sallaz attached to the Complaint stated: 
AL TERA TIO NS WILL VOID THIS TITLE 
Exhibit A to Verified Complaint. R-00049 & Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit A. 
The Verified Complaint makes no mention of the UCC, Article 9, or any section of Idaho Code 
governing secured transactions which now fonn the basis of Appellants' arguments in their 45-
page rambling brief on appeal. R-0045-0050. Mr. Sallaz' claim for Conversion as plead in the 
Verified Complaint is a vaguely plead tort based theory not grounded in any claim for a recovery 
of excess sale proceeds. R-47 and compare to the District Court's analysis at R - 001542-
001543. 
Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz sought possession of the Cadillac at an Order to Show Cause 
hearing held on April 29, 2011. At that hearing, he attempted to serve as his own bonding agent 
to attempt to evade the requirements of LC. § 8-303.4 Mr. Sallaz elected to not provide these 
pleadings or motions in the skeleton record he had prepared for his appeal. See Record of 
Actions at R-0003 (Plaintiff's Undertaking and ~Motion to Exclude Plaint(ff's Undertaking and 
Cross Examine Plaintiff and his Sureties). Following a presentation of the evidence and post-
hearing briefing, on June 14, 2011 the Court issued an Order stating: 
The Court finds that Mr. Rice has shown with sufficient probability that he 
is the official owner of record of the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and that he is 
entitled to possession of the vehicle. 
The temporary restraining order contained in the Court's Order to Show 
cause regarding sale or transfer of the vehicle is dismissed. 
R- 000224 
4 Compare the requirements of Idaho Code 12-614 to the $75,000 value of the Cadillac Mr. Sallaz alleged in his 
Complaint. Mr. Sallaz testified he was worth in excess of $150,000 above his debts and liabilities. Contrast with his 
failure to pay the judgment or attorney's fees awarded in 157 fdaho 342, 336 P.3d 275 (2014) 
and his testimony from his debtor's exam wherein he claimed to be broke and to have not paid any income tax for 
about a decade. Sec IRPC 8.4. 
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On September 16, 201 1, this Court Ordered Marcy Fox to be added as an Involuntary 
An Amended Complaint was never filed thereafter by either Plaintiff or Involuntary 
Plaintiff. R- 271-275. To properly state a prima facie claim for conversion, Marcy Fox would 
have had to allege: 
A complamt which aiieges that piaintiff is the owner and entitied to the 
possession of property therein described and that defendant converted it to his 
own use, and which states the value of the property, or alleges that plaintiff has 
been damaged in a sum named, sufficiently states a cause of action for 
conversion, unless other averments are required by statute. 
Generally, conversion is defined as a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted 
over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with rights therein. 
Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 742-743, 979 P.2d 605, 
615 (1999). 
Thus, Marcy Fox never alleged in any pleading in this case that she was 1) the owner of the 
Cadillac who had been damaged in any amount as a result of the Rices alleged conversion; or 2) 
that the Rices wrongfully asse1ied dominion over her property. See IRCP 3(a) and 7(a). 
The record demonstrates Ms. Fox was made an involuntary plaintiff under IRPC l 9(a)(l ), 
as opposed to a voluntary plaintiff. The mechanism by which she became a Plaintiff is irrelevant 
to whether she was required to properly present allegations of her prima facie case of 
Conversion. Marcy Fox entered an appearance prose on June 27, 2012, unconditionally, and 
without challenging her alignment as an involuntary plaintiff, by filing an Answer to 
Counterclaim. R- 00271 - 00275. Later on September 26, 2012 she filed an Answer o./Marcy 
Fox to Amended Counterclaim, which in relevant part simply alleged, "Fox admits the 
statements in paragraph 289 and 306 that she was assigned Dennis Sallaz' interest in the vehicle, 
but denies the rest and remainder of both paragraphs." R- 00537-00539. The only relief Marcy 
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Fox has ever sought was also stated m that same Answer of Marcy Fox to Amended 
Counterclaim. 
WHEREFORE, Fox prays for relief as follows: 
1. That this Court find Counterclaimant's Amended Counterclaim fails to 
state a cause of action against Fox and therefore must be dismissed, 
2. That this Court enter any and all additional relief as deemed just and 
proper. 
R- 00537-00539. 
Shortly thereafter, Marcy Fox was represented by Dennis Sallaz' attorney, Vernon K. Smith, for 
the duration of the case. See January 24, 2013 Notice of Appearance as reflected in the Record 
of Actions. R- 0020. 
On September 15, 2011 Mr. Sallaz and Ms. Fox filed a parallel case on an administrative 
track entitled Petition for Contested Case Hearing Re: Cancellation and Issuance of Certificates 
of Title with the Idaho Transportation Department. Tr. pp 406 - 410. Both parties were 
represented by Vernon K. Smith. Though the Petition and other pleadings associated with this 
administrative case and the subsequent appeal to the District Court were attached to Affidavits 
filed in this case, Appellants neglected to include those documents in their skeleton record for 
appeal. 
On September 21, 2011 [TD issued its Final Order Declining to Initiate a Contested 
Case Hearing. Appellants have not included that Final Order in the Record. Undeterred, on 
October 11, 2011 Mr. Sallaz (but not Ms. Fox) appealed ITD's Order declining to initiate 
contested case, which became Ada County Case No. CV OC-2011-19362. On January 19, 2012 
a hearing on Rice's Motion to Dismiss Ada Case No. CV OC-2011-19362 was held before Judge 
Sticklen. Thereafter, Ada Case No. CV OC-2011-19362 was dismissed in a written decision 
which Appellants neglected to include in the record. Thus, Mr. Sallaz proceeded on a parallel 
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administrative track, lost, appealed, and lost again; further confirming the Rice's ownership of 
the 1954 Cadillac. 
The case expanded dramatically with the filing of a Counterclaim by the Rices against 
Dennis Sallaz and his numerous simultaneously existing law firms. The procedural history is 
concisely summarized by the District Court in its the Memorandum Decision and Order on Post 
Trial Motions. R - 001529- 0015 3 7. The record reflects Mr. Sallaz made numerous attempts to 
avoid summary judgment on issues by providing false and inconsistent testimony. Perhaps most 
egregiously, Mr. Sallaz' legal counsel Vernon K. Smith took a 74 hour deposition of Roy Rice 
over the course of several months. Tr. pp. 1803. This tortuous process played out in Mr. Rice's 
home while he gasped for air, drown in his own phlegm, coughed up blood, and lay in agony due 
to his COPD and broken back from a plane crash.5 
This case then proceeded to trial on June 30, 2014 with l) no amendments to the original 
Verified Complaint and 2) Marcy Fox having never stated any allegations to support a claim for 
Conversion or any damages whatsoever. During the trial, Mr. Sallaz attempted to drag Roy Rice 
out of his deathbed, where he lay receiving morphine from hospice, and force him to endure the 
further wrath of Mr. Smith's rambling style of questioning. TR pp. 653-669. Following a trial 
which lasted approximately 2 Yi weeks in which Mr. Rice's testimony was presented by playing 
portions of his marathon video deposition, the Jury found that Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz and 
Involuntary Plaintiff Marcy Fox did not prove their claims for Conversion or Claim and Delivery 
of the l 954 Cadillac. 6 The Court subsequently issued a Afemorandum Decision and Order on 
5 A rule 53 Special Master, Jim Lynch (now deceased) was appointed by the District Court in this case as well as by 
Judge Kerrick in Rice v. Sallaz, 159 Idaho 148, 357 P.3d 1256 (2015). Despite several Orders from Judge Kerrick, 
specifically ordering Mr. Sallaz to make payment, Mr. Sallaz has still neglected to pay Mr. Lynch for his services. 
6 Marcy Fox didn't even show up for Plaintiffs' case in chief due to her attempt to avoid testifying by traveling to 
Europe during the trial. When faced with the prospect of a directed verdict, she claimed to have cut her trip short 
and appeared at trial. Tr. p. 648. 
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Past Trial klatians (TR 001529 - 001556) and an Amended Judgment on October 15, 2014 
which stated: 
Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz's and Involuntary Plaintiff Marcy Fox's claims arc 
dismissed with prejudice, with no award to either of them. 
The Rice' Counterclaim for quiet title to the disputed 1954 Cadillac Eldorado 
VIN 546265334, is dismissed as moot, with no award to the Rices. 
R - 001558. 
Though the brief entirely refers to Dennis Sallaz,'s appeal and claim to the Cadillac or its 
proceeds, the face of the brief alone indicates Involuntary Plaintiff Marcy Fox, has also appealed. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts the Facts as found by the jury after sitting through trial and as 
determined by the trial court in reaching a decision in the relevant portions of the Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Post Trial Motions. R 1529 - 1549. It is important to note the following 
chain of events to fully comprehend Mr. Sallaz' ever shifting version of the facts. Mr. Sallaz 
claimed in this case that he was the sole owner of the 1954 Cadillac dating back to the day he 
acquired the car back in the mid-l 960's. R - 0045. He claimed at trial and in his pleadings that 
the lien interest he granted Roy Rice in 1991 had been released by Mr. Rice in 1995. 
Unfortunately for Mr. Sallaz, the Rices were able to obtain historical records from the 
Idaho Department of Transportation and from Mr. Sallaz' divorce which directly undercut his 
latter day version of events. The July 20, 1995 lien release Mr. Sallaz claims to have discovered 
in his desk drawer was on his duplicate title (R-49) he obtained 5 days after granting Mr. Rice a 
lien interest. See Defendant's Trial Exhibit 228 at 13-15 and TR pp. 402-403. Mr. Sallaz' own 
sworn testimony from his divorce in 2005 confirmed 1) Roy Rice still had a lien interest (i.e. it 
could not have been released in 1995 if it existed in 2005) and 2) Mr. Sallaz valued the vehicle at 
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$25,000 in 2005 and then somehow increased the value 400% a few years later after storing the 
car outside under a tarp. See Husband's Property and Debt Schedule R - 00723, TR pp. 426-
427, 439-440, Plaintiff's Exhibit 705 (color photos of the 1954 Cadillac). Likewise, Mr. Sallaz' 
claim that he gifted the car to Marcy Fox in early 2011, allegedly just before Mr. Rice 
repossessed it, and was proceeding on behalf of Marcy Fox pursuant to a power of attorney, was 
simply not credible. Mr. Sallaz, a licensed attorney, testified falsely on numerous occasions and 
the jury did not believe him on a multitude of issues which were litigated. See IRPC 8.4. 
II 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. APPELLANTS' BRIEF FAILS TO COMPLY WITH IAR 11.2 AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
Appellant has continued a course of conduct which for which he has been admonished in 
the proceedings below. Appellant's legal counsel regularly fails to sign his briefing in what 
appears to be an attempt to evade IRCP 11 and IRPC 3.1. Now, Mr. Smith has attempted to 
avoid signing his "Appellants' Opening Brief' in direct violation ofIAR l l.2(a). 
Every notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief and other document of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one ( 1) licensed attorney of 
record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall 
be stated before the same may be filed. A party who is not represented by an 
attorney shall sign the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document 
and state the party's address. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate that the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, 
brief or other document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, 
and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
If the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other document is signed in 
violation of this rnle, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the notice of 
appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- Page l 0 
Neither the electronic copy Respondents counsel received from the Supreme Court via 
email nor the paper copy Respondents received from Appellants' counsel was signed by either 
Appellant or their legal counsel. Pursuant to IAR 32(a) and (d) Respondent hereby moves to 
dismiss this appeal. Appellants' Appeal should be dismissed per IAR 21 due to the fact 
Appeilants have not submitted a brief in compliance with IAR 11.2 or in compliance with the 
Order on their Second Motion for Extension to File Appellants' Opening Brief7 Additionally, 
Janet Rice should be awarded her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in responding to 
Appellants' unsigned brief and this frivolous appeal. 
B. APPELLANTS HA VE ABANDONED THE ISSUES THEY RAISED IN THEIR AMENDED NOTICE 
OF APPEAL. 
Appellants filed an amended notice of appeal on July 22, 2015. R-001567-001573. In 
that Notice, Appellants sought to challenge the payment of the judgment against Dennis Sallaz 
by Mr. Sallaz' law partner, Ray Schild, per LC § 10-1115. Though a skeleton record appears to 
have been prepared on this issue, the facts surrounding this issue are as follows. Mr. Sallaz 
repeatedly provided false testimony over the course of 2 days of his debtor's exam regarding his 
apparent lack of assets. Marcy Fox was also examined pursuant to IRCP 69 due to her alleged 
ownership interest in many of Mr. Sallaz' assets. Thereafter, apparently fearing testifying in his 
own examination in aid of execution or a seizure of assets Mr. Sallaz had transferred to their 
firm, Mr. Schild simply paid the Rices the remaining $45,375.46 Dennis Sallaz owed the Rices 
on the Amended Judgment. For example, though the transcript was not included, Mr. Sallaz 
testified on day one of the Debtors Exam hearing that he did not have a credit card. This 
assertion was confirmed on day two of the examination. Through a subpoena to his bank for 
7 This Second Motion for Extension was filed in what appears to be a violation ofIAR 34(e) because Appellant's 
Second Motion for Extension as filed several weeks after Appellants' brief was due per the Order granting the first 
request for an extension. 
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it was later discovered that Mr. went to Chandlers steak house a $100 dinner 
day one and two of the debtor's exam. Mr. Sallaz also attempted to avoid day two of 
the examination by claiming he was suffering from "internal bleeding." Ultimately, his doctor's 
note said he had "a cut in his mouth." In any event, there is no argument, a skeleton record, and 
no briefing on that issue. Thus the argument appears to have been abandoned by Appellant. 
South Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce County, 22 Wash.App. 738, 591 P.2d 877 (1979) 
(where issue was abandoned on appeal, the trial court's order in that regard 
became the law of the case). See also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 189, 67 
S.Ct. 657, 661, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947) ("If a litigant chooses not to continue to 
assert his rights after an intermediate tribunal has decided against him, he has 
concluded his litigation as effectively as though he had proceeded through the 
highest tribunal available to him."). 
McHugh v. A1cHugh, 115 Idaho 198,206, 766 P.2d 133, 141 (1988). 
Where an incomplete record is presented to an appellate court, missing portions of the record are 
presumed to support the action of the trial court. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 
Idaho 732, 744, 979 P.2d 605 (1999). With no record, no argument, and an unsigned brief, it is 
now time to put this particular issue to rest and deem it abandoned. The rnling of the trial court 
must stand. 
C. APPELLANTS NEVER SOUGHT TO ADD THE ESTATE OF ROY RICE OR MICHAEL RICE 
The record and Appellant's briefing reflects the fact that the remaining Defendant, Janet 
Rice, had nothing to do with the repossession and subsequent disposition of the subject 1954 
Cadillac. Michael Rice died well before trial during the pendency of this action and Plaintiffs 
never added his estate as a party. 8 Roy Rice died shortly after the Jury rendered its verdict and 
Plaintiffs never filed a claim against his estate despite receiving notice pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-
801. See Affidavit of Ronald G. Caron filed in Rice v. Sallaz, 159 Idaho 148, 357 P.3d 1256 
8 See IRCP l 7(d) Unknown Owners or Heirs as Parties. Michael Rice is the individual Mr. Sallaz appears to 
contend misappropriated the subject Cadillac. See paragraph V of the Verified Complaint which refers to Exhibit B 
(an affidavit of repossession signed by Michael Rice). 
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(20 l (Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 42161 between the same parties) and Affidavit of Vernon 
Smith in Support of Appellants' Motion for Substitution of Deceased Party Litigants filed 
herein. ("The other Respondent in this appellate process, MICHAEL RICE, was reported to have 
been a suicide that occurred in or about the month of February, 2012.") In any event, without 
any facts linking Janet Rice to the alleged conversion of the 1954 Cadillac, a victory on this 
appeal would leave Appellants with a time barred claim against deceased parties. 
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof ( except claims 
for state taxes), whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated 
or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier 
by another statute of limitations or nonclaim statute, are barred against the estate, 
the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedetit, unless 
presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or 
(2) within the time provided in section 15-3-80l(b), Idaho Code, for creditors who 
are given actual notice, and within the time provided in section 15-3-80l(a), Idaho 
Code, for all creditors barred by publication. 
(b) All claims described in subsection (a) of this section barred by the nonclaim 
statute of the decedent's domicile before the giving of notice to creditors in this 
state are also barred in this state. 
( c) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise. at or after the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof (except claims 
for state taxes), whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated 
or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred against 
the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, 
unless presented as follows: 
(1) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative, within four (4) 
months after performance by the personal representative is due; 
(2) any other claim, within the later of four (4) months after it arises, or the time 
specified in subsection (a)(l) of this section. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-803(a) & (b) 
(b) A personal representative may give written notice by mail or other delivery to 
any creditor, notifying the creditor to present his claim within four (4) months 
after the published notice if given as provided in subsection (a) of this section or 
within sixty (60) days after the mailing or delivery of the notice, whichever is 
later, or be forever barred. Written notice must be the notice described in 
subsection (a) of this section or a similar notice. 
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Idaho Code§ 15-3-80l(b). 
Thus, even if Appellants were to be victorious in this appeal, their claim against Roy 
or Michael Rice would be time barred. Furthermore, due to the absence of any facts 
supporting any involvement of Janet Rice in the repossession and sale of the 1954 Cadillac, 
under Idaho law, she has no personal liability. 
There is absolutely no proof that Peggy participated in the conversion. Moreover, 
as explained in Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 111 Idaho 349, 352-53, 
723 P.2d 893, 896-97 (1986), whether or not Tim's tortious act benefited the 
community does not change the law regarding personal liability and does not 
make one spouse personally liable for the obligation of the other. 
Carpenterv. Turrell, 148 Idaho 645,652,227 P.3d 575,582 (2010). 
Thus, no matter the outcome of this appeal, the only surviving Defendant has no personal 
liability, the 1954 Cadillac is gone, and recovery of a monetary award is not possible. 
D. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an award of attorney fees and costs for defending against this frivolous 
appeal pursuant to IAR 40 and 41. The standard for making an award of attorney fees on appeal 
is whether the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. East Shoshone Hosp. Dist. v. Nonini, 109 Idaho 937, 712 P.2d 638 (1985). As is 
discussed herein, this appeal is being pursued based on falsehoods which directly contradict the 
sworn testimony of Dennis Sallaz and in furtherance of an overall scheme to avoid the 
consequences of an adverse judgment from his divorce. The unsigned brief, in violation of IAR 
11.2, further confirms Appellants refuse to take responsibility for their frivolous assertions. An 
award of fees on appeal against both appellants is warranted. 
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STANDARD OF 
III 
ARGUMENT 
In Idaho, "[t]he standard of review applicable to questions of law is one of deference to 
factual findings, but we freely examine whether statutory and constitutional requirements have 
been met in light of the facts as found." Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 
320, 179 P.3d 276, 283 (2008). Herc, the Appellant's have presented a skeleton record when 
compared to the voluminous docket reflected in the Register of Actions. Many of Dennis 
Sallaz's sworn statements as well as evidence demonstrating his numerous falsehoods are not 
included for appellate review. By and large the bare bones record on appeal reflects Appellants 
regularly included copies of their own briefing on a multitude of issues but neglected to include 
Respondent's briefing or affidavits filed in opposition thereto. Respondents have spent enough 
money and wasted enough time dealing with Mr. Sallaz and have no obligation to shoulder the 
burden or cost of providing a complete record where Mr. Sallaz has deliberately not done so. 
Mr. Sallaz' legal counsel should know full well the consequences of providing a skeleton record 
because his own monstrosity of a divorce established the applicable legal precedent. Where an 
incomplete record is presented to an appellate court, missing portions of the record are presumed 
to suppo1t the action of the trial court. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 
744, 979 P.2d 605 (1999). Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first 
time on appeal. Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,331,971 P.2d l 151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998). The 
jury and the Trial Court ruled against Appellants. This Comt has been presented with one side of 
the facts but not the other due to Mr. Sallaz' failure to provide a complete record. The standard 
of review alone allows this Court to affirm the decision of the Trial Court. 
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THE VERDICT AND THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
Respondents adopt reasoning of the Trial Court, as to the issues on appeal, in its 
entirety. The relevant portions of the Trial Court's decision on the issues now before this Court 
are contained in the Memorandum Decision and Order on Post Trial Motions. R 001538 -
001543. Tht: Jury was instrudt:<l on the applicable law and as the Trial Court pointed out in its 
Memorandum Decision, no objections to the specific instructions or the verdict fonn were raised 
by Plaintiffs' counsel. See IRCP 5l(b). Plaintiffs did object in a general sense to the instructions 
on the grounds articulated in their unsuccessful IRCP 50(a) Motion for a Directed Verdict. The 
Jury then rendered a verdict that neither Marcy Fox nor Dennis Sallaz proved their claims of 
Conversion. Plaintiffs' appeal focuses on authority supporting arguments not raised below and 
ignores the obvious; they each failed to prove their prima facie case of Conversion. 
The Rices were issued a title to the subject 1954 Cadillac by the Idaho Department of 
Transportation on October 6, 2010 and again once they obtained possession on February 1, 2011. 
See Exhibit 22(b) (Certified records from ITD). LC.§ 49-503 states: 
Except as provided in sections 49-502, 49-510 through 49-512 and 49-514, 
Idaho Code, no person acquiring a vehicle from the owner, whether the owner is a 
dealer or otherwise, shall acquire any right, title, claim or interest in or to the 
vehicle until he has issued to him a certificate of title to that vehicle, nor shall any 
waiver or estoppel operate in favor of that person against a person having 
possession of a certificate of title or an assignment of the certificate of the vehicle 
for a valuable consideration. 
Mr. Sallaz initiated this lawsuit on April 11, 2011 by filing a Verified Complaint in his 
name only, attaching a void duplicate title. (R 00045 - 0048). Following an extensive 
examination of Mr. Sallaz and other witnesses at an April 29, 2011 Show Cause Hearing, on 
June 14, 2011 the Comi issued an Order stating: 
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The Court finds that Mr. Rice has shown with sufficient probability that he 
is the official owner of record of the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and that he is 
entitled to possession of the vehicle. 
The temporary restraining order contained in the Court's Order to Show 
cause regarding sale or transfer of the vehicle is dismissed. 
R 00224. 
The Rices l1ad legal rights in the vehicle conferred upon them first by the Idaho Depart1nent of 
Transportation as first reflected in their lien interest and subsequently in the form of a title . 
. . . A lien is perfected as of the date of the filing of a properly completed 
application with the department or an agent of the department. 
Idaho Code § 49-510. 
The Rices had no notice or knowledge of the purported January l, 2011 transfer to Marcy Fox 
due to 1) Mr. Sallaz' failure to comply with LC. § 49-504(5) and 49-503, and 2) his failure to 
challenge the validity of the Roy Rice's allegedly released lien interest in a prior action for over 
15 years since the date of the purported release. Thus, pursuant to case law Mr. Sallaz' legal 
counsel established when trying to secrete assets in his divorce, Mr. Rice's repossession in 
reliance on his lien interest was justified. 
Conversion, being a wrongful and tortious act, cannot originate in the exercise of 
a legal right, such as the right of execution on a judgment. See Carver v. Ketchum, 
53 Idaho 595,601, 26 P.2d 139, 141 (1933); see also Schlieffv. Bistline, 52 Idaho 
353, 357, 15 P.2d 726, 728 (1932). In this case, Sharon was simply exercising a 
legal right in executing a court judgment without knowledge of the transfer of the 
property to Victoria. 
Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743, 979 P.2d 605, 616 
(1999) (a case dealing with Appellants' counsel, Vernon K. Smith's, secretion of 
assets following an adverse judgment in his own divorce). 
As the District Court held, the fact that Plaintiffs may have had a legal avenue to attack 
the Rices' lien interest and subsequent possession based on the statute of limitations does not 
render Defendants' possession wrongful. Had Plaintiffs l) recorded the alleged lien release in 
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LC. § 49-504(5); 2) attacked the allegedly released lien interest in a prior 
proceeding; or 3) properly plead the present case, perhaps the Court would be faced with a 
different analysis. 
Instead, the focus of any inquiry must be on the elements of a prima facie case of 
Conversion and, in particular, which individual Plaintiff is bringing the claim - a point the 
Plaintiffs still ignore in their brief on appeal. This analysis must then be conducted in light of the 
Roy Rice's possession under his certificate of title and the Court's June 14, 2011 Order, not a 
hypothetical analysis on cases and claims that were not brought or defenses to that continued 
possession which were never properly challenged. 
Plaintiffs failed to prove the ownership element of their prima facie claims of 
Conversion. At trial, Mr. Sallaz and Ms. Fox both testified that Marcy Fox was the proper owner 
of the Cadillac and that Mr. Sallaz was representing her interests through a power of attorney. 
TR pp. 1340-1346. In fact, Ms. Fox didn't even know Mr. Sallaz "assigned" her an interest in 
the Cadillac until her deposition was taken almost 6 months after Mr. Sallaz initiated suit on her 
behalf. TR pp. 1343- 1345. She had never driven the vehicle and hadn't ridden in it for years 
before Mr. Sallaz "assigned" it to her. TR. p. 1347. Mr. Sallaz expressly disclaimed his 
ownership interest by his and Ms. Fox's testimony, thus eviscerating his claim (the only Plaintiff 
to actually assert a claim for Conversion in a pleading - See IRCP 3(a)). The Jury then found 
Ms. Fox failed to establish her ownership interest (allegedly arising January 1, 2011) in the 
Cadillac under the applicable law. Marcy Fox and Dennis Sallaz testified that the Cadillac was a 
gift and no consideration was given. TR. p. 1345. There are ample facts from which the jury 
could conclude Ms. Fox had no ownership interest or at least no ownership interest superior to 
Roy Rice. 
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Equally important, is undisputed fact that Ms. Fox never made allegations of her 
prima facie case of Conversion in a Complaint, a necessary prerequisite discussed in precedent 
Ms. Fox's legal counsel helped establish. See Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 
Idaho 732, 742-743, 979 P.2d 605, 615 (1999). What the Court is now left with is Marcy Fox's 
unpled ownership claim (allegedly superior to the Rices' claim) which the Jury found not to 
exist, and no request for damages by Marcy Fox in any Complaint. The holding of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed for Plaintiffs' failure to bring, much less establish, a prima facie case 
of Conversion and damages flowing therefrom. 
C) PLAINTIFFS' LATTER DAY ARGUMENTS REGARDING LIEN STATUTES DOES NOT 
ESTABLISH EITHER PLAINTIFF PROVED A PRIMA F ACIE CASE OF CONVERSION. 
Plaintiffs have now presented authority in support of claims they could have, but 
neglected to raise below. The issue of whether the statute of limitations impacts a secured 
creditor's rights in a chattel after it has been repossessed has nothing to do with whether 
Appellants properly established a prima facie case of conversion. In any event, Appellants new 
arguments are undercut by long standing Idaho precedent. 
Statutes of limitations are limitations on a party's right to bring an action. See 51 
Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions § 20. A statute of limitations does not apply ( l) 
to defenses where no affirmative relief is sought, or (2) to self-help set-offs and 
pledges. Kelson v. Ahlborn, 87 Idaho 519, 393 P.2d 578 (1964); Carlson v. 
Ozmun, 44 Idaho 500, 258 P. 1078 (1927). See Annot., Claim barred by limitation 
as subject of set-off, counterclaim, recoupment, cross bill, or cross action, l 
A. L. R.2d 630 ( 1948). Frank v. Davis, 34 Idaho 678, 203 P. 287 ( 1921 ). 
In Hirning v. Webb, 91 Idaho 229, 231, 419 P.2d 671, 673 (1966), this Court 
stated: 
In Kelson v. Ahlborn, 87 Idaho 519, 393 P.2d 578 [1964], this Court was 
presented with the issue of whether a defendant's cross demand, arising from the 
same transaction as the plaintiffs original claim, could be set off against the 
plaintiffs claim even though affirmative relief on the crossclaims was barred by 
the statute of limitations. This Court held that such cross demands, although 
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barred as the basis for affirmative relief, could be set off against the plaintiffs 
claim. 
This case involves the same situation as in Kelson. Here, Mrs. Smith brought an 
affirmative action seeking the return of the pledged accounts. Even if the credit 
union would have been barred by the statute of limitations from bringing an 
affirmative action on the notes and the pledge agreement because five years had 
passed, the debt could still be set off against the plaintiffs claim. Mrs. Smith has 
made only the legal argument of the statute of limitations; she has not urged, nor 
did the trial court make any findings, as to equitable considerations such as the 
doctrines oflaches and estoppel in pais. 
Secondly, the credit union's exercise of its "self-help" right of set-off contained in 
the pledge agreement did not require any court action to accomplish, and 
accordingly the statute of limitations is not implicated. Hirning v. Webb, supra; 
Kelson v. Ahlborn, supra. 
Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680, 683, 760 P.2d 19, 
22 (1988) 
Additional support for the District Court's holding on the issue of an expired statute of 
limitations can be found in the case law dealing with set offs. 
As this Court has interpreted and applied Kelson, the rule regarding setoffs is that 
equity allows a defendant to assert a setoff even when the statute of limitations 
would bar an affirmative claim. The "arising out of the same transaction" 
language has not been an essential element to the equitable principle allowing 
individuals to setoff amounts owed to them by the same person who is attempting 
to collect from them. 
Beardv. George, 135 ldaho 685,688, 23 P.3d 147, 150 (2001). 
It is true, of course, that a lien cannot exist without an underlying debt. However, 
the mere existence of a potential offset does not automatically extinguish the debt 
and cancel an otherwise valid lien. The lien is valid, and can be exercised 
lawfully, until the debt is extinguished by payment or tender. 
Comstock Inv. Corp. v. Kaniksu Resort, 117 Idaho 990, 994, 793 P.2d 222, 226 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
Here, as in Comstock, no setoff was asserted until at1er the sale by the lienholder 
had taken place. Id. Nor has there been any adjudication of the setoff to fix the 
amount to be applied toward the debt to the lienholder. Mesa's right to collect the 
full amount of the debt by a lien sale might have been subject to a timely 
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challenge, but Jahnke did not assert his challenge until after the sale and transfer 
of the property to Healy. 
Jahnke v. Mesa Equip., Inc., 128 Idaho 562, 566-67, 916 P.2d 1287, 1291-92 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
Like the later holding in Jahnke, Comstock is fatal to Plaintiffs post hoc arguments. In 
holding that the chattel owner who had been subject to a bailee's lien interest could not maintain 
an action for conversion after the sale, the Court of Appeals stated: 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Swanstrom apparently draws no distinction 
between a potential offset and an adjudicated offset. For that reason he perceives 
no difficulty in giving retroactive effect to the adjudicated offset in this case, 
thereby "eliminating" the moorage debt and invalidating the lien after the sale. 
With all due respect to our colleague, we think such after-the-fact destrnction of 
liens is unsound in policy and is an evil which the Restatement was designed to 
prevent. 
The dissenting opinion also suggests that no debt existed because the bailee, 
having breached an obligation to return or replace the missing equipment within a 
year, had no right at any time thereafter to demand payment of moorage charges. 
The district court obviously did not ascribe to this view. In any event, the dissent 
confuses a possible defense to collection of a debt with existence of the debt itself. 
Herc, the debt arose from continued mooring of the boat at the marina. The 
bailee's right to collect that debt by a lien sale might have been subject to a timely 
challenge, but in fact it was not challenged until the sale had occurred. 
Comstock Inv. Cmp. v. Kaniksu Resort, 117 Idaho 990, 995, 793 P.2d 222, 227 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
Mr. Rice provided testimony that there was an underlying debt giving rise to his security interest 
in the Cadillac in 1991. Mr. Sallaz himself went and got a duplicate title from ITD in 1991 
evidencing the existence of Mr. Rice's security interest. See Idaho Code § 49-510. 
The Comstock case further holds: 
This approach also commends itself to us as a matter of policy. It would be 
palpably unfair, and would undermine the remedial purpose of lien statutes such 
as I.C. § 45-805, if a debtor could stand silent, allowing a sale to occur without 
objection, and then obtain tort damages in a subsequent lawsuit if the debt were 
ultimately found to have an offset. The law does not, and should not, countenance 
such a retroactive tort. 
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Comstock Inv. Corp. v. Kaniksu Resort, 117 Idaho 990, 994, 793 P.2d 222, 226 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
same public policy would hold true in this case. It would be palpably unfair if a debtor, in 
this case Dennis Sallaz, could stand silent, in this case for 15 years and in violation of several 
sections of the Motor Vehicle Code, testify in another proceeding that the lien interest existed, 
allow a repossession to occur, and then obtain damages based on a previously untiled suit to 
quiet title or remove a lien interest based on an expired statute of limitations or an alleged lien 
release. Based on the holding of Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union and the policy 
standpoint articulated in Comstock, the decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
D) THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
Appellants already lost another case seeking to establish Mr. Sallaz' (or Ms. Fox's) 
ownership of the subject 1954 Cadillac. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim 
previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the 
same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. 
Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 915-916, 684 P .2d 314, 317-318 ( Ct.App.1984) 
("[T]he rule against splitting a claim applies even though the remedies or forms of 
relief demanded in one suit are different from those demanded in another."); see 
also US. Bank Nat'! Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 
(2000) (noting Idaho has adopted the "transactional approach" to res judicata). 
Moreover, other courts have held that the doctrine applies even where the prior 
litigation was a small claims action. Williams v. Christiansen, 109 Idaho 393, 
397-398, 707 P.2d 504, 508-509 (Ct.App.1985); see also Landry v. Luscher, 95 
Wash.App. 779, 976 P.2d 1274, 1278-1279 (1999), review denied, 139 Wash.2d 
l 006, 989 P.2d 1140 (1999). 
Hindmarsh v. }vfock, 138 [daho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). 
Under this doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the 
previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: ( l) the 
original action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim 
involves the same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises 
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
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Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 
(2012). 
All of the elements listed in Berkshire Investments are satisfied by the Petition for Contested 
Case Hearing Re: Cancellation and Issuance of Certificates of Title and the subsequent appeal of 
that decision in Ada Case No. CV OC-2011-19362, which has been formally dismissed and from 
which no subsequent appeal was taken within the requin.:d timefrarne. Defendants' Trial Exhibit 
213a (signed by Appellants' legal counsel). 
It is undeniable the ownership of the 1954 Cadillac has already been (or could have been) 
determined by a final order of the Idaho Department of Transportation which was not properly 
appealed by the Plaintiffs to the present litigation. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, applies to the effect of 
administrative decisions. Blackburn v. Olson, 69 Idaho 428, 433, 207 P.2d 1160, 
1163-64 (1949); Pence v. Idaho State Horse Racing Comm 'n, 109 Idaho 112, 
115,705 P.2d 1067, 1070(Ct.App.1985). 
J & J Contractors/0. T Davis Const., A.JV v. State by Idaho Transp. Bd., 118 
Idaho 535, 537, 797 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1990) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, under the doctrine of Res Judicata, the holding of Ada Case No. CV OC-2011-19362 
bars subsequent relitigation of the issue of the ownership of and right to possess the 1954 
Cadillac. 
E) THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE APPLIED 
Under the doctrine of "judicial estoppel," where a litigant obtains, by means of judicial 
allegations, a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, the litigant may not 
thereafter, by inconsistent or contrary allegations, be permitted to obtain a recovery or right 
against another party arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. Loomis v. Church, 76 
Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954); Jensen v. US. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 78 Idaho 145, 298 P.2d 
976 (1956), Idaho Trial Handbook § 11: 15 (2d ed.). Here, Mr. Sallaz (a licensed attorney) 
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asserted the Rices lien interest existed in 2006 under oath at his divorce trial. Thereafter, Mr. 
presumably prevented foreclosure of a tax lien on the Cadillac due to the existence of the 
Rice's senior lien interest See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1-A at 11 (September 29, 2010 letter 
from Idaho State Tax Commission). This Court should not allow a party to play fast and loose 
with his testimony and the recordation of documents to gain a civil advantage against anyone 
with an adverse interest. See IRPC 8.4. The lien cannot have both existed in 2005 and have 
been released in 1995, as Mr. Sallaz claimed after Mr. Rice's repossession in 2011. One version 
of Mr. Sallaz' testimony must be false and he should not profit from his dishonesty. 
CONCLUSION 
This case and the other Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce offshoot cases are an illustration of what 
our civil justice system will devolve into if procedural and criminal safeguards are not enforced. 
The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata serve to prevent re-litigation of issues and 
claims which were previously decided. Judicial estoppcl and quasi-estoppcl arc supposed to 
prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the facts. The crime of pe1jury makes no 
distinction between civil and criminal cases. Indeed, Idaho's citizens would have little incentive 
to respond tmthfully on their tax returns if courts and prosecutors looked the other way when 
confronted with perjury in a civil case. Civil judgments should be enforced and not dodged. 
Judicial or prosecutorial apathy towards perjury in civil cases will eventually erode our justice 
system leaving Idaho's citizens to resort to street duels. Enforcement of civil petjury should 
allow for the application of LR.E. 609(a) to prevent untmthful witnesses from spinning 
additional lies. The Rules of Professional Conduct are designed to deter and ultimately purge 
our system of dishonesty by officers of the court. Holding egregious professional disciplinary 
matters in abeyance for years while a civil case plays out can allow unscmpulous attorneys to I) 
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to bring our profession into disrepute and 2) engage in dilator; tactics to postpone 
professional disciplinary proceedings for years. This ordeal, only a portion of which is presently 
before this Court, represents a breakdown in our civil justice system and is a disgrace to the legal 
profession. 
Though Mr. Rice exercised self-help, as a lienholder he was permitted to do so. The 
adage "possession is 9/101115 of the law" rings true in this case. Mr. Sallaz played fast and loose 
with fraudulent transfers, inconsistent testimony, void duplicate titles, unrecorded lien releases, 
unrecorded assignments, sloppy pleading, deficient motion practice, an incomplete record on 
appeal, an unsigned brief, and litigation on dual tracks. Mr. Sallaz' actions placed the ownership 
of this vehicle into legal limbo. This Court should not support his post-hoc rationalization of his 
fraudulent conduct. Mr. Sallaz' antics created the purgatory he now laments and provided a 
factual basis for the jury to determine neither Mr. Sallaz nor Ms. Fox presented a prima facie 
case of Conversion. Respondents ask that the holding of the Trial Court be affirmed so as to put 
an end to this aspect of the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. 
DATED this of March 2016. 
Attorney for 
Defendant / Counterclaimant / Respondent 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this __ day of March 2016, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was served upon opposing counsei as follows: 
V.K. Smith 
1900 W. Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
Office of Bar Counsel 
Idaho State Bar 
525 W. Jefferson 
Boise, ID 83702 
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